








































Despite the fact that many scholars have 
studied the issue of ethnic conflicts in 
former Yugoslavia, the democratization 
process of former Yugoslav republics 
has been somewhat neglected. In the 
words of Segert and Džihić: "The area 
of the former Yugoslavia remained a 
blank spot on the map of these analy-
ses" (2012: 240). This especially applies 
to Montenegro and this paper tries to at 
least partially fill in this gap.1 The small-
est ex-Yugoslav republic belongs to the 
group of Eastern European countries in 
which the process of the consolidation 
of democracy did not commence after 
the first multi-party elections in 1990 
1 Apart from studies such as Bieber 2003; 
Vujadinović et al. 2003; Vuković 2015.
and the phase of democratization. In 
other words, instead of observing the 
consolidation of democracy after the 
establishment of a formally democratic 
system, one witnessed an authoritarian 
regression. Accordingly, a hybrid regime 
was established that could best be de-
scribed as competitive authoritarianism 
(Levitsky and Way 2010). At the centre 
of the Montenegrin political system was 
"one for Montenegrin circumstances 
big authoritarian party" (Darmanović 
2007: 85). The League of Communists, 
in 1991 renamed the DPS (Democratic 
Party of Socialists), won by a large ma-
jority the election in 1990 (83 of 125 
seats), in 1992 (46 of 85), and in 1996 
(45 of 71), something that no other for-
mer communist party or any other party 
in Southeast Europe was able to do.
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Abstract almost 20 years since the fall of the semi-authoritarian regime, Montene-
gro is still regarded as a defective and not as a consolidated democracy. this article 
puts forward one key determinant for the slow process of democratic consolida-
tion in Montenegro – the unresolved statehood problem. it thereby does not focus 
on the functional state, but instead uses the classical definition of statehood with 
three dimensions: state power, state territory, and the people. the article seeks to 
contribute to a better understanding of two issues: the democratization process 
of Montenegro and the relationship between the state and democracy. it uses the 
explaining outcome process tracing method and attempts to craft a minimally suf-
ficient explanation of an outcome by developing theoretical causal mechanisms.

























In 1997, and only a few months after 
the DPS confidently won the election 
against the united opposition, "the divi-
sion between Bulatović and Đukanović 
over the issue of political partnership 
with Milošević put an end to the abso-
lute domination of their party over Mon-
tenegrin politics" (Vuković 2015: 77).2 
This polarization led namely to the split 
up of the party and a significant number 
of the DPS members joined Bulatović’s 
newly created Socialist People’s Party 
(SNP). As a result of this, the political 
game in Montenegro changed complete-
ly, with new rules and a new balance of 
forces (Darmanović 2003: 148). This 
new phase of Montenegrin pluralism 
began on the 1st of September 1997 with 
an "Agreement on the Minimum Princi-
ples for the Development of Democratic 
Infrastructure", which had been nego-
tiated between the "new" DPS and the 
opposition. With this agreement, the op-
position received guarantees that future 
elections would be free and fair. Subse-
quently, the parliamentary election held 
in 1998 was the first election in country’s 
history to meet the minimum standards 
of freedom, competitiveness, and other 
democratic procedures, which many or-
ganizations that observed the elections, 
such as the OSCE, confirmed (OSCE 
1998: 3).
Yet almost twenty years since, Monte-
negro still cannot be classified as a con-
solidated democracy, as is confirmed by 
the latest Bertelsmann Transformation 
Index report (BTI Montenegro 2016).3 
2 However, in an interview with the author, 
Bulatović claims that the external factor – 
the USA – and its promises to Đukanović 
also played an important role (Podgorica, 
July 2014). Momir Bulatović, at that time 
the President of Montenegro and the leader 
of the DPS, and Milo Đukanović, at that 
time the Prime Minister of Montenegro 
and deputy leader of the DPS, were two 
most important Montenegrin political 
actors in the nineties.
3 The Bertelsmann Transformation Index 
Moreover, according to the BTI, the 
state of Montenegro‘s democracy has 
not improved at all in the last decade. 
Both the report of 2008 (BTI Montene-
gro 2008) and last year’s report award-
ed Montenegro an identical note – 7,85 
(BTI Montenegro 2016).4 Consequently, 
the question that arises is how is Monte-
negro’s stagnating process of democracy 
consolidation to be explained?
Unlike the work of many other schol-
ars that focus on state weaknesses, i.e. 
on a (poorly) functioning state and its 
impact on democracy (O’Donnell 1999; 
Merkel 2007; Segert and Džihić 2012), 
this paper accentuates the matters of 
state power, state territory, and the peo-
ple. It thereby argues that the fulfilment 
of all statehood criteria is a precondition 
for a rapid consolidation of democ-
racy. While Montenegro fulfilled two 
statehood criteria (undisputed borders 
and monopoly on the legitimate use of 
force), the issue of the nation is still dis-
putable. Furthermore, in order to clear-
ly demonstrate the decisive role of the 
statehood problem, this paper uses the 
process-tracing method, which is em-
ployed as the major causal inference tool 
in qualitative research (George and Ben-
nett 2005; Beach and Pedersen 2011). It 
includes "attempts to identify the inter-
vening causal process – the causal chain 
and causal mechanism – between an 
independent variable (or variables) and 
the outcome of the dependent variable" 
(George and Bennett 2005: 206-207). 
The explaining outcome process tracing 
of Beach and Pedersen, which puts an 
emphasis on a "puzzling historical out-
come by building minimally sufficient 
explanation in case study" (2011: 32), 
(BTI) analyzes and evaluates the quality 
of democracy in developing and transition 
countries. It thereby measures successes 
and setbacks on the path towards demo-
cracy.
4 The report from the year 2006 concerned 








































seems to be the most applicable meth-
od for this study. In accordance with 
Beach’s and Pedersen’s understanding of 
process tracing this paper thus attempts 
to craft a minimally sufficient explana-
tion of an outcome by developing causal 
mechanisms.5
The remainder of the paper provides 
an explanatory framework for Montene-
gro’s slow process of democratic consoli-
dation, followed by a detailed analysis of 
the impact of the explanatory variable. 




Albeit entering the transformation pro-
cess with structural preconditions that 
hamper rather than promote the suc-
cessful transition to a democracy, this 
article argues that they cannot serve 
5 Besides the secondary resources this paper 
also uses the data that were collected during 
two field works in Montenegro when inter-
views with experts and former politicians 
were conducted (July 2014 und September 
2014). These were one-on-one semi-struc-
tured interviews. 
as key explanatory variables of Monte-
negro’s slow democratic development. 
In a way to make my thesis more com-
prehensive, this paper will give a brief 
comparative overview of Montenegro 
and Croatia, which, according to the 
2016 BTI report, is the only former Yu-
goslav republic, besides Slovenia, that is 
classified as a democracy in consolida-
tion. Montenegro and Croatia started 
their transition processes with similar 
structural preconditions that decisively 
influence the success of the transition 
to a democracy: the lack of liberal tra-
dition;6 the nature and length of pre-
vious authoritarian regimes– not only 
the "communist" regime but also the 
"pre-communist" one, the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia; a system change as control 
from above and dissolution and creation 
of new states; ethnic heterogeneity (in 
6 In both countries there was no long phase of 
political liberalization and democratization 
before the 1990 election. Parliamentary life 
in Montenegro from 1905, when the first 
Constitution of the Kingdom of Montene-
gro was adopted, and the fact that between 
1861 and 1910 only 2% of the Croatian pop-
ulation had the right to vote (Zakošek 1997: 
34), hardly qualifies as a liberal tradition. 






























































Croatia $5184 3% 54% Men 68.59; Women 75.95 23.4% 36% 9.3%
Monte-
negro $2932 5.9% 58%
Men 71.98; 
Women 78.43 29.5% 35% 8.8%
Sources: Dolenec 2013: 61; Latifić 1997: 132; Statistical Yearbook of Croatia 2009 and of Montenegro 
1991, Census 1991, and private communication with the Croatian Bureau of Statistics (December 2013).
*The data about the Croatian GDP in US dollars was found in Dolenec 2013: 61. The data about GDP per 
capita in Yugoslav dinars, 19 424 for Croatia and 10 989 for Montenegro, was found in Latifić 1997: 132. 
























the year 1990, 22% of the Croatian and 
29% of Montenegrin population con-
sisted of minorities (Janjić 2000: 112); 
and a similar socioeconomic develop-
ment (see Table 1).
Moreover, both in Montenegro and 
Croatia competitive authoritarianism 
regime emerged shortly after the fall 
of communism and Montenegro even 
achieved an electoral democracy almost 
two years before Croatia (the regime of 
Franjo Tudjman crumbled in the year 
2000). In addition, both countries be-
long to the group of Eastern European 
countries to which the European per-
spective was promised much later. The 
EU had developed a regional approach 
policy for the countries of the Western 
Balkans and the summit in Thessaloniki 
in June 2003 eventually confirmed the 
accession prospect of these countries. 
Therefore, Montenegro and Croatia 
started the process of accession to the EU 
at the same point in time and under the 
same conditions and with the external 
factor playing an important role in their 
democracy consolidation processes (El-
basani 2013a; Keil and Arkan 2015). 
However, the unresolved statehood 
problem led to high adoption costs of 
the EU rules in Montenegro thus ham-
pering a stronger and more successful 
impact of the EU, as Gordana Đurović, 
the former Montenegrin Minister for 
European Integration, confirmed in an 
interview (Podgorica, July 2014).7 What 
is more, the accession process of Mon-
tenegro was additionally slowed down 
because contested statehood absorbs 
much of the energy needed for reforms 
(Elbasani 2013b).
Despite these important similarities, 
Montenegro and Croatia are character-
ized by different outcomes with respect 
to the consolidation of democracy. Con-
7 More on the role of the domestic factors in 
the Europeanization process see Milačić 
2017a. 
trary to Montenegro, Croatia is a de-
mocracy in consolidation (BTI Report 
2016). Since the illustrated similarities 
have eliminated many potential expla-
nations, different outcomes are mainly 
to be explained with the remaining dif-
ference – the statehood problem. Under 
statehood this paper understands both 
the state-building and the nation-build-
ing. In order for state-building to be 
completed, a country has to fulfil two 
criteria: the government has the right to 
dispose of all power on its territory (un-
disputed borders) and any other pow-
er is prohibited from exercising power 
on that territory without the express 
permission from the state government 
(the monopoly on the legitimate use 
of force) (Jellinek 1905). With respect 
to nation-building, it must be decid-
ed who belongs to the people. In other 
words, whether membership in the na-
tion is determined by identity criteria 
such as religion, language, and ethnicity 
(Flora et al. 1999) or if it is defined in 
accordance with a civic concept of citi-
zenship, which "envisages the nation as 
a community of equal, rights-bearing 
citizens, united in patriotic attachment 
to a shared set of political practices and 
values" regardless of race, religion, and 
ethnicity (Ignatieff 1993: 3).
By using this kind of statehood defini-
tion, this paper does not in any way deny 
the fact that a poorly functioning state is 
one of the main obstacles for stabiliza-
tion and consolidation of a democratic 
system. However, it claims that as long 
as the issues regarding the territory and 
the people of the state remain disputa-
ble, the process of building a functional 
state will be thwarted. To put it in an-
other way: if the matters of the "frame-
work" are not resolved, this will hamper 
the process of improving the "content" 
inside that "framework" (Milačić 2017b: 
371) which is why this examination puts 








































Accordingly, while after the fall of 
Tuđman’s regime Croatia entered the 
phase of democracy consolidation with 
a resolved statehood problem, Monte-
negro only completed its state-building 
in 2006, while the nation-building is still 
an ongoing process. Since 1998, and thus 
after the restoration of Eastern Slavonia 
into Croatian jurisdiction, as the last 
part of the Croatian territory that was 
still occupied by Serbian rebels, Croatia 
has fulfilled all statehood criteria: the 
undisputed borders; a state's monopo-
ly on the legitimate use of force on the 
whole territory; and we know who the 
people are: in accordance with an eth-
nic concept of citizenship, the Constitu-
tion defines them as "Croats and others" 
and such a notion is not questioned by 
any important Croatian political actor. 
On the other hand, while Montenegro 
fulfilled two statehood criteria – undis-
puted borders and monopoly on the le-
gitimate use of force – after the 2006 in-
dependence referendum, the issue of the 
nation is still disputable and dominates 
the whole political system. The dispute 
is namely about "whether Montenegro 
will define itself as a multinational state 
dominated by Montenegrins or Serbs 
or whether it will manage to avoid the 
regional pattern of ethnically defined 
states and hang on to the concept of civ-
ic society" (Bieber 2010: 964).
The model that will serve for analysing 
the impact of the explanatory variable 
(statehood problem) is Merkel's (1998) 
model of democracy consolidation, 
which is highly compatible with the BTI 
(see Merkel 2007). In his model, Merkel 
differentiates four levels of democracy 
consolidation: constitutional consoli-
dation, as the consolidation of the cen-
tral constitutional organs and political 
institutions, such as the head of state, 
government, parliament, judicial, and 
electoral systems; representative consol-
idation, which involves the level of ter-
ritorial (parties) and functional (interest 
groups) interest representation; behav-
ioural consolidation, which refers to 
reducing the attractiveness for powerful 
actors (the military, large landowners, 
businessmen, radical movements, clan-
destine groups, or populist, charismatic 
leaders) to pursue interests outside the 
democratic institutions and against the 
democratically legitimated representa-
tives; and consolidation of civil society 
and civic culture (Merkel 1998: 39-40).
Democracy consolidation 
under the shadow of 
the statehood issue
Due to the ambivalent attitude of the 
majority of Montenegrin orthodox 
population towards their identity – the 
controversial question what Montene-
grins are: a separate nation or "the best 
of Serbdom"? (Pavlović 2003) – the 
pro-Montenegrin vs. pro-Serb polar-
ization has been shaping Montene-
grin society for more than 100 years. 
Whereas according to the latter narra-
tive Montenegrins are only a territorial 
identity within the Serbian nation, the 
former one argues that Montenegrins 
should call themselves a nation because 
they have an independent political his-
tory and different traditions and cus-
toms (Pavlović 2003; Džankić 2014). 
As pointed out by Andrijašević, in this 
struggle neither side was able to prevail 
permanently: while in 1918, following 
Serbia’s annexation of Montenegro, the 
pro-Serb option won, in 1945, under 
communism, Montenegro got its state-
ness back, whereby the pro-Montene-
grin option won; while in 1989 the pro-
Serb option prevailed again, the majori-
ty of the Montenegrin citizens voted for 
the country's independence in the 2006 
referendum (Interview, Bar, July 2014). 
In the years after the fall of communism 
the ambivalence regarding national 
























census of the population. While in 1991, 
61.86% of the population identified 
themselves as Montenegrins and 9.34% 
as Serbs, Montenegrins made up 43.16% 
and Serbs 31.99% of the population at 
the 2003 census. At the last census in 
2011, 44.98% identified themselves as 
Montenegrins and 28.73% as Serbs. In 
view of the fact that since the year 1990 
the Orthodox population grew by only 
5% through migration, this can be ex-
plained as the change of identity within 
the same population (Bieber and Win-
terhagen 2009: 15). And while being a 
Montenegrin in the last two censuses 
also implied a distinction from the Ser-
bian identity, this was not the case in the 
1991 census.
The illustrated issue has been causing 
a deep polarization of the Montenegrin 
society and has had a negative impact 
on the process of democracy consolida-
tion. As already noted, Montenegro met 
the criteria for an electoral democracy 
in 1998. Almost twenty years later, the 
country still cannot be classified as a 
consolidated democracy. The following 
sections of the paper will demonstrate 
how the unresolved statehood problem 
has affected each level of the Merkel’s 
model, thereby preventing the consoli-
dation of democracy.
impact on constitutional 
consolidation
In order to fully understand the consti-
tutional consolidation in Montenegro, 
one must also analyse the very begin-
ning of the institutionalization process. 
The first Constitution of Montenegro 
was adopted on 12th of October 1992 
by the Parliament of Montenegro. The 
constitution-making was not the result 
of a wide constitutional debate, but was 
carried out by the dominant Montene-
grin party, the DPS, which enjoyed an 
absolute majority in Parliament. This 
party thus had absolute control over the 
institution-building process and there 
was no consensus among elites on the 
rules of the game.
In the new Constitution, Montenegro 
was not defined as an ethnic state. The 
preamble of the Constitution referred to 
"citizens of Montenegro" and the Con-
stitution guaranteed the protection of 
national, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and 
religious identity of the minorities (Art. 
67) as well as their right to use nation-
al symbols (Art. 69), the language, and 
the alphabet (Art. 9). It can therefore be 
said that the first Montenegrin Consti-
tution was characterized by a low degree 
of constitutional nationalism (Hayden 
1992). That is in particularly accurate if 
one compares Montenegro with, for ex-
ample, Serbia and Croatia, where strong 
ethno-nationalist mobilization led to 
an ethnic institutionalization.8 Howev-
er, the new Constitution emphasized a 
pro-Serbian nation-building. The new 
Montenegrin flag was the red-blue-
white tricolour – only a colour shade 
distinguished it from the Serbian one 
(the Montenegrin blue was brighter) – 
and the official language was defined as 
Serbian in the ijekavian form (Art. 9).
According to the new Constitution, 
Montenegro had a premier-presiden-
tial system of government (Shugart and 
Carey 2003) with a directly elected pres-
ident, who did not enjoy much power 
despite his direct legitimacy (Art. 88): 
the President appointed the Prime Min-
8 In December 1990, the new Croatian Con-
stitution was adopted, defining Croatia as 
"the national state of the Croatian people 
and a state of members of other nations and 
minorities who are its citizens". Serbs, the 
largest national minority in Croatia, thus 
lost the status of constitutive nation. In 
March 1989, the Serbian Parliament passed 
the amendments to the Republic’s Consti-
tution abolishing the political autonomy of 
its provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo. This 
significantly degraded political status of 









































ister (after consultations with parlia-
mentary parties), but could not dismiss 
neither the government nor any indi-
vidual minister, proclaimed laws (with 
suspensory veto) and could dissolve 
the parliament after a justified propos-
al by the government. The weaker in-
stitutional position of the President in 
Montenegro in comparison with that of 
Serbia or Croatia is to be explained by a 
lower intensity of ethno-nationalist ide-
ology. Accordingly, there was no need 
for strong personalities with sacrosanct 
authority, which is why no cult around 
any Montenegrin politician was created, 
who would have enjoyed the plebiscitary 
legitimacy. "In Serbia and Croatia the 
masses wanted a leader, in Montenegro 
not", as the first President of Montene-
gro Momir Bulatović claims (Interview, 
Podgorica, July 2014).9 Therefore, the 
political system was not developed in a 
direction that knows only two relevant 
political actors – leader and the masses 
(the majority nation). Nevertheless, the 
established system was not a democratic 
9 However, it must be noted that Slobodan 
Milošević, at that time the President of Ser-
bia, enjoyed broad support in the Montene-
grin electorate. Svetozar Marović, a former 
deputy leader of the DPS, confirmed this 
in an interview by saying that "we all were 
aware that Milošević was by far the most 
popular politician in Montenegro, perhaps 
even more popular in Montenegro than in 
Serbia" (Podgorica, September 2014).
one, but a hybrid regime in the form of 
competitive authoritarianism. As noted 
by Darmanović (2003: 147): "The DPS 
held the system together by assiduous-
ly using its complete control over state 
organs and resources in order to squelch 
critics and rivals and win elections. The 
usual range of methods was employed, 
including party domination of the state-
owned media; the packing of offices 
with party favorites; the maintenance of 
slush funds; occasional intimidation of 
adversaries; the abuse of police authori-
ty to influence the electoral process; and 
manipulations of the electoral system. 
Backed by these kinds of tactics, the 
DPS easily bested its dispirited oppo-
nents and retained an absolute majority 
of seats in the Montenegrin parliament". 
As already noted in the introduction, 
this competitive authoritarianism re-
gime lasted until the split up of the DPS 
and the first free elections in 1998.
After the fall of Milošević’s regime in 
October 2000, the future status of Mon-
tenegro came to the forefront of Monte-
negrin politics. Milošević was replaced 
by democratic opposition and there 
were no more security risks in resolving 
this issue. This was followed by the re-
invention of the DPS itself as the lead-
er of the Montenegrin independence 
movement (Džankić and Keil 2017: 5). 
The party that in the 1990s promoted 
the pro-Serbian and the pro-Union na-
Figure 1. Causal Mechanism 1*
Delay of the start of 
the constitutional 
consolidation (until 
2007) and slowing 
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tion-state building policy was now lead-
ing the pro-Montenegrin and pro-inde-
pendence block. Contrary to that, the 
opposition’s goal was the preservation 
of a common state with Serbia and this 
was also the case with the new Serbian 
leadership. The focus of political actors 
was therefore on the "framework" of 
the political unit and this had profound 
negative effects on the constitutional 
consolidation.
Consequently, until 2006 a dysfunc-
tional government structure existed at 
the federal level that delayed institution-
al reforms for years. Already in 2002 the 
constitutional reform was blocked as a 
result of the unresolved statehood issue, 
which was also stressed by the Europe-
an Commission in its report (2002: 6). 
Under strong pressure from the Euro-
pean Union a compromise – the "Bel-
grade Agreement" and the creation of a 
State Union of Serbia and Montenegro 
– was reached in March 2002. Howev-
er, Montenegro was granted the right to 
organize an independence referendum 
in three years. Montenegrin leadership 
used these three years to campaign for 
independence and institutional reforms 
were backgrounded accordingly. Its fo-
cus was namely on undermining the 
functionality of the new union. There-
fore, the adoption of the Constitutional 
Charter of Serbia and Montenegro re-
mained in a political deadlock for more 
than a year and another intervention by 
Javier Solana, European Union's High 
Representative for Common Foreign 
and Security Policy, was needed for it to 
be adopted (Teokarević 2003). Moreo-
ver, by 2004, governance at union level 
had virtually collapsed and Montenegro 
rejected all constitutional obligations, 
such as holding direct elections for the 
parliament of the union (Schimmelfen-
nig et al. 2006: 226).
Two years later, on the 21st of May 
2006, 55.5% of the Montenegrin citi-
zens voted in the referendum for inde-
pendence. This result expressed an even 
higher legitimacy if one bears in mind 
an impressive turnout of 86.5%. After 
the adoption of the new Constitution in 
2007, constitutional consolidation final-
ly commenced and Montenegro entered 
the phase of the consolidation of its key 
institutions. Yet this occurred almost ten 
years after the fall of the semi-authori-
tarian regime and the delay was a direct 
consequence of the unresolved state-
hood issue.
The completed state-building did not 
bring about a rapid constitutional con-
solidation. In the constitution-making 
process the focus of Montenegrin polit-
ical actors was not on the standards and 
design of the key institutions, but on 
nation-building. The new Constitution, 
which confirmed the premier-presiden-
tial system of government, was adopted 
only after months of negotiations con-
cerning identity issues.10 According to 
the Constitution, Montenegro is a civic 
state as the constitutive people are the 
citizens of Montenegro, and not a par-
ticular ethnic group. The preamble sets 
out nations and minorities in Montene-
gro – Montenegrins, Serbs, Bosniaks, 
Albanians, Muslims, Croats, and oth-
ers – and also emphasizes the values of 
multiculturalism, peace and tolerance. 
Such a civic understanding of the na-
tion reflects a social reality that is rath-
er unique in the Balkans (Bieber and 
Winterhagen 2009: 3). Furthermore, 
the state language is defined as Monte-
negrin (Art. 13), and not Serbian as in 
the Constitution of 1992.11 The 2004 de-
10 The changes compared to the 1992 Consti-
tution concerned mainly the field of human 
rights protection and the separation of 
powers by strengthening the independence 
of the judiciary and extending human and 
minority rights protection (see Bieber 2010: 
945).
11 Serbian, Bosnian, Croatian, and Albanian 








































cision of the Parliament on the national 
flag and anthem was confirmed as well. 
The flag of the state is no longer the tri-
colour, which is similar to Serbian, and 
the song "Oj, svijetla Majska zoro" (Oh, 
bright May morning) has been selected 
for the national anthem.12 Contrary to 
that, the parties of the pro-Serbian op-
position advocated the Serbian identi-
ty of Montenegro: the definition of the 
state language as Serbian, the tricolour 
flag, the "Onamo, namo" (There, over 
there) song, which is reminiscent of the 
Ottoman conquest of Kosovo, as the of-
ficial anthem, and a special role for the 
Serbian Orthodox Church.13
The adoption of the Constitution did 
not put an end to identity disputes. These 
issues still dominate the political system 
of Montenegro, thereby causing strong 
polarization and slowing down the con-
solidation of key institutions. On the one 
hand, the opposition parties use every 
opportunity to try to change the state 
symbols even at the cost of the institu-
tionalization of the system. So, for exam-
ple, they were blocking for months the 
adoption of the new election law, which 
was set by the European Commission as 
a precondition for the start of the nego-
tiation process, demanding that the gov-
ernment meets their demands regarding 
12 Parts of the national anthem were allegedly 
written by Sekula Drljević and this makes 
it unacceptable for the opposition. Drljević 
was a highly controversial figure. At first a 
supporter of Serbia‘s annexation of Monte-
negro, he later, during the Second World 
War, collaborated with the Italian occupi-
ers and supported independence of Monte-
negro. Moreover, he also collaborated with 
the Ustaša and embraced the concept of the 
Montenegrins as close to the Croats.
13 The Orthodox Church was mentioned in 
the Constitution together with Catholic 
and Islamic community. However, it was 
not mentioned to which Orthodox Church 
the Constitution refers. Besides the Serbian 
Orthodox Church, the Montenegrin Ortho-
dox Church also exists in Montenegro.
the name of the official language and 
the citizenship law. On the other hand, 
the DPS has been instrumentalizing the 
identity conflict in the country by por-
traying itself as a protector of the Mon-
tenegrin nation and the independence 
of Montenegro (Džankić and Keil 2017: 
1). It has twisted every available political 
issue into a Montenegrin-Serb question. 
This creation of an anti-imagery (‘us’ 
versus ‘them’) has been an important el-
ement of the continuity of its rule (Ibid: 
8). However, such long-lasting domi-
nance impairs the functionality of the 
institutions (BTI Report 2014). There-
fore, it is no surprise that although the 
separation of powers is present, parlia-
ment's ability to control the government 
is limited and the independence of the 
judiciary needs to be further strength-
ened (European Commission 2015: 6-9). 
Moreover, a domination of the executive 
branch is existent and this was for a long 
time manifested in the person of Milo 
Đukanović. Albeit no longer the Prime 
Minister, he is still an undisputed charis-
matic leader of the DPS.
impact on representative 
consolidation
Following the break-up of Yugoslavia, 
identity issues played an important role 
in the party system of Montenegro dur-
ing the period of the semi-authoritarian 
regime. However, their dominance over 
the party system was established only 
after the fall of Milošević’s regime in 
2000.14 The struggle between two com-
14 In particularly after the end of the war in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 a pro vs. 
against authoritarianism cleavage domina-
ted the party system. This was confirmed 
by, at that time, very unusual coalition for 
the 1996 parliamentary elections between 
the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro 
(LSCG), a pro-Montenegrin and pro-West-
ern party, and People’s Party, a party that 
strongly supported the "Greater Serbia" 
project. The only common ground between 
























peting nation-state building projects 
– the pro-Montenegrin vs. the pro-Ser-
bian – caused a high level of ethnifica-
tion of the party system and contributed 
significantly to the irrelevance of the 
socio-economic cleavage for political 
competition as well. The party system 
was thus established on the basis of an 
ethnic cleavage, which is characterized 
by zero-sum games, and in which eth-
nic issues have a clear priority over class 
and distributional ones. Such a scenar-
io prevented the consolidation of de-
mocracy due to the fact that the party 
system, which is consolidated along an 
ethnic cleavage, carries in itself a con-
stant threat to democratic consolidation 
(Merkel 1997: 348). In such conflicts, 
the political debate does not revolve 
around "more or less", but around "ei-
ther-or", as these types of identities are 
considered unchangeable (Elster et al. 
1998). It is very unlikely that a com-
promise will be reached, because it is 
much easier to achieve one with respect 
to the socio-economic issues than to 
find an acceptable middle ground be-
tween the Serbian and Montenegrin na-
tion-state building policies. In the words 
of Horowitz (1985: 224): "How does a 
policy maker divide up the ‘glorification’ 
of the national language?" and the same 
goes for other identity issues.
This ethnic cleavage contained the 
split between the centre (Yugoslavia) and 
the periphery (Montenegro). The centre 
represented a pro-union state-build-
ing policy and an exclusive concept of 
semi-authoritarian regime of the DPS. 
pro-Serbian nation-building policy, 
which was also hostile to minority cul-
tures, while the periphery represented 
a pro-independence state-building and 
a pro-Montenegrin nation-building 
policy, which was compatible with mi-
nority cultures. Despite the fact that the 
deep polarization lightened once the 
state-building problem was resolved 
in 2006, the unsolved problem of na-
tion-building continues to provide the 
grounds for a strong polarization. In 
other words, the cultural dimension of 
the centre-periphery cleavage has dom-
inated the party system since 2006: the 
pro-Serbian nation-building policy vs. 
the pro-Montenegrin nation-building 
one. Such a strong and deep polariza-
tion was confirmed by the Ipsos report 
(2011) on nation-building in Monte-
negro. Montenegrins and Serbs, who 
according to the last census from 2011 
represent 73.7% of the population of 
Montenegro, answered much different-
ly when asked about the acceptance of 
the Montenegrin language, the Monte-
negrin Orthodox Church, the Monte-
negrin national flag, the Montenegrin 
national anthem, Montenegro as patria, 
and the importance of their ethnic iden-
tity (see Chart 1).
Deep polarization is not only main-
tained by such strong differences but 
furthered by political elites who have 
shown no serious interest in resolv-
ing identity issues. They serve, above 
all, the DPS and the largest pro-Serbi-
an opposition party Nova as a political 
instrument for mobilizing followers 
Figure 2. Causal Mechanism 2
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and for diverting the discussion from 
socioeconomic issues (Poeschke and 
Milačić 2014: 99). As a consequence, 
a great ideological distance between 
the left and the right pole of the party 
system are maintained.15 Such focus on 
identity issues also strongly contributed 
to an increased emphasis of the ethnic 
component by the parties of minorities 
(Vuković and Milačić 2016), which in 
turn further increases the level of ethni-
fication of the party system.
Moreover, the current party system is 
also characterized by a bilateral oppo-
sition as some opposition parties with 
their pro-Montenegrin and pro-civic 
party programs – such as the SDP and 
the URA (United Reformist Action) 
– are much closer to the DPS than to 
15 In the last two years another identity issue 
has strongly polarized Montenegrin society: 
membership in the NATO. Two poles of this 
polarization are the same as with respect 
to the nation-building cleavage: the DPS, 
which supports the Montenegrin member-
ship, and the Nova, which strongly opposes 
it. Needless to say, these two parties strongly 
benefited from the new polarization.
the Nova-led Democratic Front (DF). 
Therefore, a party system characterized 
by the prevalence of ethnic cleavage, a 
high degree of polarization, and a bi-
lateral opposition is to be classified as 
non-consolidated.
The fall of the Montenegrin hybrid 
regime in 1998 did not bring in the 
pluralism of trade unions. The SSSCG 
(the Confederation of the Independent 
Unions of Montenegro) with its 90.000 
members and 19 trade unions organ-
izations in the year 2003 remained the 
single confederation of unions (Đurić 
2002/2003: 33). Yet this did not mean 
that the Montenegrin trade union scene 
was a monolith one as polarization took 
place in a different manner. Two polit-
ical orientations existed simultaneous-
ly within the SSSCG: the pro-Yugoslav 
(Serbian) and the pro-Montenegrin 
one. The polarization of the society as 
a whole was thus reflected on the trade 
unions. The general position of the SSS-
CG leadership was that more politics 
in their activities would cause the con-
federation to split into two unions with 
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different national omens. Therefore, the 
activities of Montenegrin trade unions 
were scarce and it would not be an exag-
geration if one described their behavior 
as self-censorship.
However, many union members were 
becoming increasingly dissatisfied with 
such an approach that was turning the 
trade unions into an irrelevant actor. 
They left the SSSCG and established a 
new trade union confederation – the 
Association of Independent Trade Un-
ions of Montenegro (USSCG). Instead 
of the common fight for workers’ rights 
the relationship between the two trade 
union organizations in Montenegro 
has been characterized by competition. 
These quarrels caused a drop in power 
for both trade unions and a slump in 
membership numbers as well. While 
the SSSCG, as already noted, had 90.000 
members in 2003, the two organizations 
combined had only 66.000 members in 
2010 (Simović 2011: 11). They are cur-
rently even more marginalized and very 
much irrelevant.
impact on behavioural 
consolidation
In many former Yugoslav republics the 
war created powerful social and politi-
cal actors that were a major obstacle to 
the consolidation of democracy (Milačić 
2017b). These actors exploited their in-
tervention potential – acquired through 
the ethno radical politics of the political 
actors – in order to meet their particu-
lar interests, which were not consistent 
with the democratic rules of the game.16 
16 Croatia and Serbia offer perfect examples 
of these "exclusive domains" that originate 
from the war. After the regime change, the 
veteran‘s associations represented a major 
threat to the consolidation of democracy in 
Croatia and Croatia's cooperation with the 
Hague Tribunal triggered also the conflict 
between the government and another veto 
player – the military. In Serbia, Zvezdan 
Jovanović, deputy commander of the JSO 
The fact that Montenegro was not char-
acterized by a strong ethno-nationalist 
mobilization, which was accompanied 
by war, led furthermore to a situation 
where this country did not have to deal 
with veto players that originated from 
the war. Montenegro was only briefly 
directly involved in the war when the 
units of the Yugoslav People's Army 
from Montenegro attacked Dubrovnik 
(October 1991- May 1992). Therefore, 
there were no powerful social and polit-
ical actors in Montenegro who were try-
ing to enforce their interests outside of 
the democratic institutions and against 
the democratically elected representa-
tives: neither intelligence agencies and 
nationalist groups nor special police and 
army forces.
impact on the consolidation of 
civil society and civic culture
The ethno-nationalist mobilization led 
in Montenegro to the development of 
civil society on an ethnic and religious 
basis, which in turn had a negative im-
pact on the development of civic culture. 
However, during the war in former Yu-
goslavia a number of associations and 
media were established that opposed 
the war, the nationalism, the xenopho-
bia and hate speech, and that criticized 
the political and military actions of the 
Montenegrin authorities as well. These 
pro-democracy citizens' associations 
fought against their marginal social sta-
tus and political climate that prevented 
the development of a democratic civil 
society (Darmanović and Bojović 2005: 
343-344). They worked close together 
with two pro-democratic opposition 
parties – the LSCG and the SDP – and 
formed the Montenegrin pro-democra-
cy movement. For these reasons, they 
– a highly militarized police force of the 
State Security Service that was established 
as a paramilitary unit in 1990 to incite 
Serb rebellion in Croatia – assassinated the 








































were strongly suppressed by the gov-
ernment. These organizations helped 
the other side of Montenegro to raise its 
voice, but they did not play a significant 
role in country’s transformation process. 
At that time, Montenegrin civil society 
was still in an embryonic state.
Once the hybrid regime crumbled, the 
Montenegrin civil society went through 
intensive development. Immediately 
after the Law on Non-Governmental 
Organizations was passed (July 1999) 
as one of the first Montenegrin reform 
laws, numerous civilian programs and 
projects were launched (345). In the year 
2000, there were 543 associations, 10 
foundations, and 41 foreign NGOs reg-
istered. According to the "World Values 
Survey" from 2001, which considered 
political parties, churches (religious or-
ganizations), and sport clubs as a part 
of the civil society, 44% of respondents 
said that they were members of a civil 
society organization. Such rapid estab-
lishment of the NGOs continued and 
in 2002 there were 1811 associations, 54 
foundations, and 72 foreign NGOs reg-
istered (Darmanović and Bojović 2005: 
350). The number of organizations has 
thus almost quadrupled in just two years 
and in 2006 there were as many as 3600 
NGOs registered (Bieber 2010: 958).
The government initially supported 
the development of the civil society and 
regarded it not as an opponent, but as a 
partner in the struggle against Slobodan 
Milošević. In certain aspects this rela-
tionship contained elements of a "stra-
tegic alliance" (Darmanović and Bojović 
2005: 346) with negative consequences 
for the civil society. The armistice with 
the government of Montenegro pre-
vented civil society organizations from 
developing into advocates of citizens' 
interests and critics of the government 
(Muk et al. 2006: 18). Therefore, the rap-
id development of the civil society did 
not bring about an equal improvement 
of democratic standards.
After the fall of Milošević’s regime in 
2000, this strategic alliance broke up. 
Yet this time the unresolved statehood 
problem prevented the clear positioning 
of the civil society as a critic of the gov-
ernment and dulled its activities as most 
of the major NGOs strongly supported 
the government’s project of an inde-
pendent Montenegro. In other words, 
they subordinated their activities to the 
government‘s policy and the independ-
ence of Montenegro.
The completion of state-building in 
2006 finally led to a critical positioning 
of civil society organizations towards 
the government, whereby they became 
more active in promoting the public in-
terest. They emphasized the need for the 
fight against corruption and demanded 
Figure 3. Causal Mechanism 3
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transparency of the institutions. How-
ever, unfinished nation-building, i.e. 
the focus of political actors on identity 
issues, marginalized the issues of the 
civil society and delayed the creation of 
an institutional framework for the coop-
eration between the civil society and the 
government, which significantly slowed 
down its development. The Government 
Office for Cooperation with NGOs, 
which aim is to work directly with civil 
society organizations to develop mutu-
al coordination and cooperation as well 
as to promote transparency of the work, 
was established as late as 2007 (Tacso 
2010: 11). The Council on Cooperation 
between the government and NGOs was 
established even later – in April 2010. 
All this strongly contributed to the fact 
that, according to the 2015 Civil Society 
Organizations Sustainability Index for 
Central and Eastern Europe and Eura-
sia, Montenegro, together with Serbia, 
has the lowest level of sustainability of 
civil society organizations in the region 
(CSO 2015).
Conclusion
By analysing the process of democracy 
consolidation in Montenegro, this pa-
per argued that the unresolved state-
hood problem has been the main ob-
stacle on the Montenegrin path towards 
a consolidated democracy. And while 
the state-building has been completed, 
the issue of the nation is still disputa-
ble. As long as that remains to be the 
case, Montenegro will either stagnate 
or very slowly move towards the status 
of a consolidated democracy. In this 
context, a civic state concept, which the 
Constitution already promotes, would 
be of the greatest advantage out of two 
following reasons: firstly, history teach-
es us that the victory of one nation-state 
building idea, either pro-Montenegrin 
or pro-Serb one, never meant the per-
manent marginalization of the other 
one. Therefore, a solution based on the 
civic concept of citizenship, which also 
emphasizes multiple and complemen-
tary identities (Linz and Stepan 1996), 
seems to be the only sustainable one. 
Only such a solution, which is also in-
clusive towards minorities, would ad-
dress the interests of both pro-Mon-
tenegrin and pro-Serbian population. 
Secondly, strong promotion of a civic 
national identity would also imply the 
strengthening of the democratic sys-
tem. As pointed out by Shulman, in or-
der for civic nation-building to succeed, 
the laws and political institutions of a 
country must be seen in a positive light 
by its citizenry (2005). In other words, 
without strong institutions there can be 
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Crna Gora:  
"Izgubljena" u problemu državnosti
Sažetak gotovo dvadeset godina od sloma poluautoritarnog režima Crna gora još 
se kategorizira kao defektna, a ne kao konsolidirana demokracija. U ovome članku 
analizira se ključna odrednica sporog procesa demokratske konsolidacije u Crnoj 
gori – neriješen problem državnosti. autor se pritom ne usredotočuje na funkcio-
nalnu državu nego, umjesto toga, koristi klasičnu definiciju državnosti s trima di-
menzijama: državna moć, državni teritorij i narod. Članak nastoji pridonijeti boljem 
razumijevanju dvaju pitanja: procesu demokratizacije u Crnoj gori i odnosu države 
i demokracije. U analizi se koristi metoda process-tracing kako bi se došlo do mini-
malnoga dovoljnog objašnjenja ishoda razvojem teorijskih uzročnih mehanizama.
Ključne riječi Crna gora, konsolidacija demokracije, izgradnja nacionalne države, 
pitanja identiteta
